# 1NR

## Heidegger

#### Extend the perm as a test of competition.

#### Extend their Kateb evidence. It non-uniques all of their add-ons. Tech thought is inevitable, meaning that solves for asteroids and managerialism of the environment. Also, there is no evidence that they are the entirety of tech thought, meaning other instances solve.

## CP

### Japan-AddOn

#### Thesis of the add-on is spillover of the technology. Plan does that just has a state funding mechanism to do so, meaning we access the add-on.

#### Globalization means state policy causes international modeling

Robinson 7 (J.D. @ Yale Law School, Fox Fellow at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Nick, “Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the Decentralization of Foreign Policy,” Akron Law Review, lexis, TGA)

And yet, state and local governments today have become deeply enmeshed in international affairs as globalization has decentralized foreign relations. On the one hand, localities have become more autonomous international actors than they ever were or could have been before. In pursuing interests with international implications, they tread in a sphere traditionally monopolized by the federal government. On the other hand, the internationalization of many formerly domestic issues means that an increasing number of traditional state and local government actions now have foreign policy implications. The emergence of localities as actors in American foreign policy creates new possibilities for creating more participatory and democratic international relations. It also merely reflects a world where increased interconnectivity across borders and the global regulation of markets and values has collapsed local and international concerns. This article will argue that U.S. foreign relations law has failed to address this new reality. The Supreme Court has largely clung either explicitly or implicitly to a jurisprudence that holds that the country should speak [\*649] with "one voice" in foreign relations. Such a position is not only naive, but it also weakens American democracy. With globalization's commingling of the local and the international, a strong judicial bias towards federalizing issues with a bearing on foreign relations will lead to a hollowing out of the decision-making power of localities. States and municipalities will risk becoming largely units of administrative governance.

#### Relations resilient

Bowring 09(Philip, Consultant Editor of the online news magazine Asia Sentinel, columnist for the International Herald Tribune, and former editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, 7/28. “America's Balancing Act.” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/opinion/28iht-edbowring.html?hpw)

Mrs. Clinton’s appearance certainly gave a boost to Asean ministers — whose meetings had often failed to lure her predecessor. But the reality is that Washington’s Asia policies cannot change much. Although the gradual exit from Iraq and the end of “war-on-terror” rhetoric have helped re-balance Washington’s attention, the United States has many interests pulling it in different directions — China, India, Japan, nonproliferation, trade, climate change, etc. The key is balance, not change. Sad to say for Asean, Southeast Asia does not pull in any definable direction. At the Phuket meeting, Clinton focused attention on North Korea, a country where Asean members have no discernible influence, and on Myanmar, whose government is impervious to foreign rhetoric. The United States is conscious of its declining influence in Southeast Asia. Washington’s Middle East obsessions were partly to blame, but more important has been the rise of China as an economic power. Competition among China, Japan and South Korea to help Asean countries has stimulated East Asian economic cooperation. China has pushed “friendship” through free trade agreements that look good on paper. With the United States in recession and its financial institutions disgraced, it may seem like a poor time to imagine that America can revive its influence with official visits and rhetoric. The White House has failed to push a free trade deal with South Korea through Congress, so it can forget about reaching anything like that with Asean. Yet, paradoxically, this may be the best of times for the region to remember how dependent it remains on the United States. Few Asean members want to see the security umbrella — to which most contribute — diminished by U.S. budget pressures and engagements elsewhere. Member states that had been embracing China’s rapid rise are beginning to wonder whether it is now proving to be too fast for their good. Indeed, Beijing has shown poor timing by resurrecting historic claims to the whole South China Sea. Events in Xinjiang and Tibet have also been reminders of resentment over Han Chinese settlements. To all this, one must add the benefits of the Obama effect on perceptions of America, particularly in Islamic Southeast Asia. The economic crisis has been a reminder that Southeast Asia’s economic health remains more dependent on a global system that the United States still dominates. China’s influence will continue to increase, but that makes it more important for the region not to neglect its other links. Washington does not need new policies in Southeast Asia. A little attention will go a long way, as will speaking softly while being as helpful as possible on issues like disaster relief, fighting terrorism, building trade and maintaining financial stability. Superficially, things may look different in Japan, where the Liberal Democratic Party, for decades a faithful servant of U.S. policies, will probably soon be replaced by the Democratic Party of Japan, which, in theory, remains wary of the U.S. military presence, is opposed to Japanese military involvement overseas, and wants to improve relations with China. But the party is backtracking on these positions as elections approach, so foreign policies are unlikely to change significantly. The rise of China and the enigma of nuclear North Korea will keep the United States and Japan in alliance for a long while yet.

### Agents CP

#### Ground: The States counterplan is core negative ground under a domestic resolution because there is an intrinsic debate to be had over the federal government or the states doing the plan.

#### Education – it’s crucial for policymakers to engage in this key question of agents.

Biering, former Executive Fellow in the California Resources Agency, ‘8

[Brian, 23 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 35, AG]

Federalism issues aside, the fundamental question policymakers need to resolve is whether it is more appropriate for the states to act now in the area of climate change, or whether the field should be simply left to the federal government to address in its own time.

#### Search for the best policy option: The judge should vote for the most competitive policy option- key to testing all parts of the plan.

#### Reciprocity: They get the USFG and all its actors- we should get the states- key to fairness.

#### Predictability: It’s a domestic topic- they should be ready to debate the States counterplan.

#### Literature checks: policy analysis of state energy policy is critical to the topic because states play a huge role in energy policy.

NREL, ‘11

[National Renewable Energy Laboratory, ““The Role of State Clean Energy Policies”, 6-30-11 http://www.nrel.gov/applying\_technologies/state\_local\_activities/state\_policy\_role.html]

**State policy has been a critical driver in the emergence of clean energy.** In many respects, states are leading the way for clean energy technologies and policies. They have demonstrated both the viability and the modest costs of specific renewable energy policies. As states continue to push the boundaries of what clean energy can offer, there are new challenges including transmission development and a desire to maximize policy effectiveness. In addition, states that may not have been as active in the past are now looking to ramp up support for clean energy technologies. **Many lessons can be learned from states' past experiences**. However, new contexts and differing priorities may require new analysis and nuance to understand how policies developed in one state may impact clean energy markets and goals in another. As a result, **the demand for objective policy analysis at the state level continues to grow**. It's expected to continue as long as states adopt clean energy goals and targets.

#### Potential abuse is not a voting issue: It’s arbitrary. Make them prove in-round abuse.

#### At worst reject the argument, not the team.

### Condo

#### Strategic thinking – condo forces 2AC time and strategy pressure – makes them consider argument interaction and make smart choices– only long-term skill we learn in debate.

#### ...

#### Neg flex – key to test the aff from multiple angles and give us strategic options – aff gets to speak first and last, no one advocates the squo on this topic

#### ...

#### Logical decisionmaking – no one would vote for something worse than the squo – makes their model terminally useless

#### ...

#### Skews inevitable – we could read more T or case arguments to waste time

#### ...

#### 2NR checks – narrows the debate to one world for in-depth discussion.

#### ...

#### CI –one CP and one K – checks regression.

#### ...

#### ...

#### Reasonability – no neg resolution means all theory interpretations are arbitrary. They have to win we destroy debate in this instance to win.

## Case

### Solvency

#### No nuclear renaissance – Fukushima and viability of natural gas have killed the movement.

LaMonica, ‘12

(Martin, Staff Writer, “Nuclear renaissance? More like nuclear standstill”, CNET, 3-10-12,

http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386\_3-57394666-76/nuclear-renaissance-more-like-nuclear-standstill/, accessed 8-1-12, RSR)

One year after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, nuclear power is either slogging ahead or at the end of the road, depending on which country you live in. How nuclear grows in the years ahead largely depends on whether new designs can demonstrate better safety and, more importantly, compete on price. Rather than freeze nuclear's progress, Fukushima simply made it harder to make the case for building new plants, experts say. Indeed, one of the primary barriers to a nuclear renaissance is cheap natural gas, not public opinion. "The nuclear renaissance was a very optimistic view that many new nuclear plants would be built, but the slowdown was largely triggered by events that occurred before Fukushima," said Andrew Kadak, a former professor of nuclear science and engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Because of new drilling techniques, natural gas prices have plummeted in the last few years, making it more attractive. "If natural gas is currently where it is, it's difficult to justify the large capital investment for electricity production for the long term. Nuclear is a 30- or 60-year commitment," Kadak said. Also stacked against nuclear are rising construction costs and regulatory delays, he said.

#### Alt causes to nuke power investment – gas prices, carbon prices, recession costs, and public support are reasons why the plan doesn’t get done.

#### Nobody has money

Cooper, senior research fellow for economic analysis – Institute for Energy and the Environment @ Vermont Law School, PhD – Yale University, ‘12

[Mark, “Nuclear safety and affordable reactors: Can we have both?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 68, No. 4, p. 61–72]

Has the heralded ‘nuclear renaissance’ finally arrived? In February 2012, for the first time in more than 30 years, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a license to build two new nuclear reactors. In March, the NRC approved a license for two more new reactors, and utilities have submitted applications for 23 additional reactors. Two of those reactors would be at a brand-new nuclear power plant in Florida’s Levy County, where Progress Energy Florida recently agreed to a settlement that will allow the utility to collect $350 million from customers over the next five years as a down payment. Look more closely at what’s happening in Levy County, however, and you’ll see that the nuclear industry’s slump is not over yet. The new Levy County reactors will not start operating for at least another decade, if ever. It’s all a question of money: The utility estimates that the reactors will cost between $17 billion and $22 billion, not counting financing charges and cost overruns, which have plagued the nuclear industry. (Progress originally estimated that the reactors would cost $5 billion and would commence operation in 2016.) With the demand for electricity growing at a snail’s pace, and natural gas prices at a fraction of what the utility expected when it filed its application for a new plant in 2008, opposition to the project has mounted, threatening a rerun of the 1970s and 1980s, when the majority of nuclear construction plans were canceled or abandoned.

#### No investors - laundry list

Tickell 12

Oliver Tickell, As a student of physics at St John's College, Oxford, Tickell holds a masters degree from Oxford University. He is a founding partner of Oxford Climate Associates and a member of the Oxford Geoengineering Institute, April/May 2012, "Thorium: Not ‘green’, not ‘viable’, and not likely", http://www.jonathonporritt.com/sites/default/files/users/Thorium%20briefing%20FINAL%203.7.12.pdf

4.3 Thorium and LFTRs – investment outlook The development of thorium / LFTR technologies represents a poor investment for national governments, utilities and private investors given:  the marginal benefits to be derived from using thorium fuels in existing reactor designs;  the very long-term nature of any benefit that may be realised from LFTRs, of the order of half a century;  the uncertainty as to whether the very significant technical challenges of the LFTR will ever be overcome;  the possibility that the materials used for reactor construction may degrade more rapidly than anticipated, causing early shut-down;  the likely very high cost of LFTR electricity – especially when compared against the anticipated low future cost of electricity from renewable sources, solar in particular, over the applicable time frame.

### Prolif

#### A ton of technological hurdles must be jumped through before getting a nuclear weapon – low probability of impact

Sterngold 4 (James, Staff, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/04/18/MNGP9673BG1.DTL&ao=3, dw: 4-18-2004, da: 7-9-2011, lido)

 Michael May, a former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where U.S. nuclear weapons are designed, and now a professor emeritus at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, said the technological hurdles to a terrorist bomb remain, realistically, quite high. He discounted the possibility terrorists could make use of a stolen warhead because of all the sophisticated security devices built into them. He also said it would be all but impossible for a non-state terrorist group to develop the capability of making its own weapons-grade uranium, because of the industrial infrastructure required. The real fear, he said, is that terrorists could steal or buy from corrupt officials weapons-grade uranium, either from Russia or perhaps a country like Pakistan, where many government and military officials are sympathetic to radical Islamists. Getting that material is far more difficult than actually creating a workable weapon, he said. "Scientists have been pointing to this possibility for years," May said.

#### Conventional retaliation is most likely.

Sanger and Shanker, NYT Staff Writers, ‘7

[David and Thom, “U.S. Debates Deterrence for Nuclear Terrorism,” NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/washington/08nuke.html?\_r=2&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin]

Among the subjects of the meeting last year was whether to issue a warning to all countries around the world that if a nuclear weapon was detonated on American soil and was traced back to any nation’s stockpiles, through nuclear forensics, the United States would hold that country “fully responsible” for the consequences of the explosion. The term “fully responsible” was left deliberately vague so that it would be unclear whether the United States would respond with a retaliatory nuclear attack, or, far more likely, a nonnuclear retaliation, whether military or diplomatic.

#### Obama won’t push nonproliferation leverage.

Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, ‘12

[Jeffrey, 8-1-12, It's Not as Easy as 1-2-3, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/01/it\_s\_not\_as\_easy\_as\_1\_2\_3?page=full]

That's why others in the nonproliferation community have argued that the United States should use its desirability as a partner in nuclear cooperation as leverage. States are unlikely to forgo ENR programs simply because the United States or others offer cheap alternatives. A little muscle is called for - and circumstances have offered leverage: With more than a dozen new agreements to be negotiated, the Obama administration has an opportunity to write into many agreements a new, stronger nonproliferation standard. So far, however, **the administration has been reluctant to put the squeeze on** potential **partners**. Many Obama officials took the view outlined by Poneman in his article - that asking states to renounce ENR could make the situation worse. (It is important to note that I am not aware of Poneman's view inside the interagency deliberations.) So the administration has largely avoided pressuring states to renounce enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Despite early talk of the "gold standard," this January the administration announced it would take what officials described as a case-by-case approach. In bureaucratic terms, **this amounts to** having **no standard at all**. **It is hard to imagine a less restrictive policy**. I suppose the administration could announce it would not even try. As it is, they will try - but not very hard.

#### Makes nonproliferation ineffective

Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, ‘12

[Richard, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30]

In recent years, a new nonproliferation instrument has appeared: a restructured 123 nuclear cooperation agreement, developed in the course of negotiations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and signed in 2009. This agreement, unlike previous bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, offers a model for demand side nonproliferation, with the UAE vowing to forgo all enrichment and reprocessing technology on its own soil. It goes far beyond, for example, the “veto” on reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel broached in the negotiations with the Shah. **This “Gold Standard” agreement**, much hailed at first, particularly in contrast to Iran’s enrichment activities, **has begun to lose its luster as, once again, competing priorities marginalize nonproliferation**. In January 2012, the Obama Administration announced that a “case by case” approach would be taken to the application of the Gold Standard. Countries such as Vietnam, where the U.S. holds out hope for a grander partnership aimed at countering China, **may not be held to the UAE’s standard**.100 Today, as in the 1970s with the Symington and Glenn Amendments, Congress seems most concerned about the prospect of proliferation of ENR technology. The UAE case is a striking reminder of the lasting **challenge facing** American **nonproliferation** efforts. As a global power with ranging interests, governed by a political system where dissenting factions in Congress, the White House, and bureaucratic organs can influence policy in a number of ways, and operating in an international system with its own constraints on U.S. power, **the U**nited **S**tates **has struggled to marshal its strength toward persuading countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making**. While there is no guarantee that the decisive and steadfast application of sticks and carrots in the cases above would have changed the outcomes—it may have brought unintended consequences of its own—a commitment to doing so would have improved the chance of persuading countries to eschew fuel-making.

#### Nuclear energy cred fails—countries say no to US tech if it constrains them

Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, ‘12

[Richard, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30]

The examples above show the limitations of both demand and supply side efforts. Supply side diplomatic interventions, made before the transfer of technology, have been at times effective, particularly in precluding nuclear fuel-making in the short term and buying time for more lasting solutions. However, as the Pakistan and Brazil cases illustrated, supply side interventions are no substitute for demand side solutions: **Countries face political choices regarding nuclear fuel-making**. **A nation set upon an independent fuel-making capacity**, such as Pakistan or Brazil, **is unlikely to give up efforts because of supply side controls**. Multilateral fuel-making arrangements, as proposed repeatedly by the United States, have not materialized and therefore seem to have had little tangible influence.

#### Prefer our evidence—history proves

Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, ‘12

[Richard, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30]

In recent years, there has been a resurgence of proposals designed to limit the spread of nuclear fuel-making facilities, with the understanding that ostensibly peaceful technology can allow for the production of the fissile material required for a nuclear weapon. With U.S. proposals ranging from the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to a revamped, “Gold Standard” bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, a wider array of tools has been put at the disposal of American policy makers. Prominent members of the international community have become agitated about the prospect of the proliferation of fuel-making technology as well, with numerous proposals of fuel assurances put forward by such disparate figures as Vladimir Putin and Mohamed ElBaradei. But **renewed enthusiasm for nonproliferation begs questions about how novel the instruments proposed are, and**, moreover, **how effective they are likely to be,** particularly for the country historically at the head of nonproliferation efforts, the United States. A review of this historical record suggests that **optimism** about the U.S. ability to dissuade countries from this path **is misplaced**. This essay considers supply side proposals of fuel assurance, multilateral fuel-making, as well as specific interventions on both the supply and demand sides, consulting particular cases in Iran (1974-1978), West Germany-Brazil (1975-1977), South Korea (1974-1976) and Pakistan (1972-1980) to draw lessons about the effectiveness of U.S. practices under differing circumstances. The record these cases give is mixed, due to two principal causes. The first is the failure of the U.S. to consistently prioritize nonproliferation efforts given Washington’s global and competing interests, interests that tend to be embraced by different factions in the federal government apparatus but whose ultimate arbiter is the president (along with his close advisors). The second is the tendency of decisions about nuclear fuel-making by the state in question to be influenced more by fundamental trends or factors than diplomatic maneuvering from Washington; diplomacy is most effective when it has the political, economic and military backing to implicate these issues. The most important factor in U.S. efforts has tended to be the bilateral relationship between Washington and the country at hand. Decision-makers who consider their country’s relationship with the U.S. to be strategically vital—and believe that fuel-making would threaten this relationship—are most likely to forgo enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology. This calculus can be informed by a range of dynamics, some beyond U.S. control, such as security concerns, issues of prestige, and commercial and industrial interests. Domestic politics and public opinion, both in the United States and in the country considering fuel-making, can be influential. One of the fundamental tensions of American nonproliferation efforts lies with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the international legal framework of reference in nonproliferation matters. The prevailing interpretation of the NPT centers on what has been referred to as the “fundamental bargain”: in exchange for nuclear-weapons states’ movement toward disarmament and their sharing of technology and expertise for peaceful nuclear energy, nonnuclear weapons states will not pursue the bomb.1 One portion of the NPT, in particular, has borne on U.S. efforts to persuade countries not to pursue nuclear fuel-making technology: Article IV. Here, the NPT enshrines the “inalienable right…to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” and pledges signatories to “undertake to facilitate…the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”2 Traditionally, the U.S. has elected for an ambiguous middle ground, not denying an Article IV “inalienable” right to fuel-making, but not acknowledging it either.3 While U.S. interpretations of the NPT have not, as a practical matter, stemmed its attempts to convince countries to eschew nuclear fuel-making technology, the NPT’s bargain has shaped certain stances, particularly supply side proposals such as fuel assurances. The application of U.S. national power, on both the supply and demand sides of nuclear fuel-making, can play a role in convincing countries of the benefits of their relationship with Washington and the costs to be incurred if this relationship were fractured. The adroit use of “sticks” and “carrots” can withhold or provide incentives for cooperation, convincing countries considering ENR that the risks of doing so outweigh the benefits. The **case studies** examined here **suggest** that if the United States is to give the impression that a bilateral relationship rests in the balance, Washington may have to undertake risks of its own, perhaps compromising other policy objects for the sake of nonproliferation. **When** the **circumstances** have **called for Washington to put nonproliferation goals above others, policy makers** have often **failed to do so.**

#### No widespread proliferation.

Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR, ‘12

[Jacques, /16/12, North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show]

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. **Such warnings have routinely proved wrong** - for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq - but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground - and their failure rate is much higher - than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age. As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. **These problems are debilitating**, and **they cannot be fixed** simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

### Warming

#### Cosmic rays and CFCs.

University of Waterloo 9

[From the University of Waterloo press release. Study shows CFCs, cosmic rays major culprits for global warming 22 12 2009, http://wattsupwiththat.com/2009/12/22/study-shows-cfcs-cosmic-rays-major-culprits-for-global-warming/]

Cosmic rays and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), both already implicated in depleting the Earth’s ozone layer, are also responsible for changes in the global climate, a University of Waterloo [Lu, a professor of physics and astronomy] scientist reports in a new peer-reviewed paper. In his paper, Qing-Bin Lu, a professor of physics and astronomy, shows how CFCs – compounds once widely used as refrigerants – and cosmic rays – energy particles originating in outer space – are mostly to blame for climate change, rather than carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. His paper, derived from observations of satellite, ground-based and balloon measurements as well as an innovative use of an established mechanism, was published online in the prestigious journal Physics Reports. “My findings do not agree with the climate models that conventionally thought that greenhouse gases, mainly CO2, are the major culprits for the global warming seen in the late 20th century,” Lu said. “Instead, the observed data show that CFCs conspiring with cosmic rays most likely caused both the Antarctic ozone hole and global warming. These findings are totally unexpected and striking, as I was focused on studying the mechanism for the formation of the ozone hole, rather than global warming.” His conclusions are based on observations that from 1950 up to now, the climate in the Arctic and Antarctic atmospheres has been completely controlled by CFCs and cosmic rays, with no CO2 impact. “Most remarkably, the total amount of CFCs, ozone-depleting molecules that are well-known greenhouse gases, has decreased around 2000,” Lu said. “Correspondingly, the global surface temperature has also dropped. In striking contrast, the CO2 level has kept rising since 1850 and now is at its largest growth rate.” In his research, Lu discovers that while there was global warming from 1950 to 2000, there has been global cooling since 2002. The cooling trend will continue for the next 50 years, according to his new research observations. As well, there is no solid evidence that the global warming from 1950 to 2000 was due to CO2. Instead, Lu notes, it was probably due to CFCs conspiring with cosmic rays. And from 1850 to 1950, the recorded CO2 level increased significantly because of the industrial revolution, while the global temperature kept nearly constant or only rose by about 0.1 C.

#### Wind turbines.

Carrington 12(Damian Carrington head of environment at the Guardian. „Windfarms can increase night time temperatures, research reveals” The Guardian April 29, 2012 DOA August 16, 12 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/apr/29/wind-farms-night-temperatures-study> )

Large windfarms can increase local night time temperatures by fanning warmer air onto the ground, new research has revealed. The study used satellite data to show that **the building of huge windfarms** in west Texas **over the last decade has warmed the nights by up to 0.72C.**¶ “Wind power is going to be a part of the solution to the climate change, air pollution and energy security problem," said Liming Zhou, at the University of Albany in New York. "But understanding the impacts of windfarms is critical for developing management strategies to ensure the long-term sustainability of wind power."¶ West Texas has seen rapid expansions of windfarms, with turbine numbers rising from 111 in 2003 to 2358 in 2011. Zhou's team compared the land surface temperatures at the windfarms with other areas across this period and detected a clear rise at night.¶ They note, however, that the effect on the air temperature, which is usually given in weather forecasts, will be lower than 0.72C rise because they respond less quickly to changes than land temperatures.¶ The scientists say **the effect is due to the gentle turbulence caused by the wind turbines. After** the **sun** has **set**, the **land cools** down **more quickly than the air, leaving a cold blanket of air just above the ground.** But **the turbine wakes mix this cold layer with the warmer air above, raising the temperature.** A previous study found a similar effect but was based on data from only two weather stations over just six weeks.

#### Air conditioners.

Rosenthal and Lehren 12 (Elisabeth Rosenthal and Andrew Lehren; New York Times „Relief in Every Window, but Global Worry Too” June 20, 2012. DOA August 16, 12 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/asia/global-demand-for-air-conditioning-forces-tough-environmental-choices.html?pagewanted=all>)

In the ramshackle apartment blocks and sooty concrete homes that line the dusty roads of urban [India](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/india/index.html?inline=nyt-geo), there is a new status symbol on proud display. **An air-conditioner has become a sign of middle-class status in developing nations**, a must-have dowry item.**¶ It is** cheaper than a car, and arguably more **life-changing in steamy regions, where cooling can make it easier for a child to study or a worker to sleep.¶** But as air-conditioners sprout from windows and storefronts across the world, **scientists are becoming increasingly alarmed about the impact of the gases on which they run. All are potent agents of** [**global warming**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/globalwarming/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier)**. Air-conditioning sales are growing 20 percent a year in China and India**, as middle classes grow, units become more affordable and temperatures rise with climate change. **The potential cooling demands of upwardly mobile Mumbai, India, alone** [**have been estimated**](http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=the-needs-of-tropical-mega-cities-c-2010-08) **to be a quarter of those of the United States.Air-conditioning gases are regulated** primarily **though** a 1987 treaty called the [**Montreal Protocol**](http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTTMP/0%2C%2CmenuPK%3A408237%26#126;pagePK:149018&%23126;piPK:149093&%23126;theSitePK:408230,00.html)**,** created to protect the ozone layer. It has reduced damage to that vital shield, which blocks cancer-causing ultraviolet rays, by mandating the use of progressively more benign gases. The oldest [CFC coolants](http://www.epa.gov/ozone/defns.html), which are highly damaging to the ozone layer, have been largely eliminated from use; and the newest ones, used widely in industrialized nations, have little or no effect on it.**¶ But these gases have an impact the ozone treaty largely ignores. Pound for pound, they** contribute to global warming thousands of times more than **does** carbon dioxide, the standard greenhouse gas.**¶** The leading scientists in the field have just [calculated](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/335/6071/922) that **if all the equipment entering the world market uses the newest gases currently employed in air-conditioners,** up to 27 percent of all global warming will be attributable to those gases by 2050**.**

#### NP is too little too late for climate change, renewable energy like solar and wind will be efficient and cost-competitive by the time the first reactor could be built.

Mariotte 7 (Michael, executive director, Nuclear Info and Resource Service, Nov 6 http://www.cfr.org/publication/14718/nuclear\_power\_in\_response\_to\_climate\_change.html)

Environmental advocates considering “reconsidering” nuclear power in light of climate change are too late. The accelerating pace of the climate crisis and the dawning realization that we no longer have the luxury of a few decades to address the crisis already have made nuclear power an irrelevant technology in terms of climate. Even if the nuclear industry had solved the safety, radioactive waste, proliferation, cost, and other issues that ended its first generation—and it hasn’t solved any of those problems—it wouldn’t matter. What nuclear power can offer for climate is simply too little, too late. The major studies that have looked at the issue—[MIT](http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/), the National Commission on [Energy Policy](http://www.energycommission.org/site/page.php?index), etc.—generally agree that for nuclear to make a meaningful contribution to carbon emissions reduction would require reactor construction on a massive scale: 1,200 to 2,000 new reactors worldwide, 200 to 400 in the United States alone. And that would have to be done over the next f40 to 50 years. Pity poor Japan Steel Works, the world’s major facility for forging reactor pressure vessels (there is one other, small-capacity facility in Russia): working overtime it can produce twleve pressure vessels per year. Do the math: That’s less than half of what is needed. Even if someone put in the billions of dollars and years necessary to build a new forging facility, it’s still not enough, not fast enough. There are 104 operable reactors in the United States today. In November 2017, no matter how much taxpayer money is thrown at the nuclear industry, there will be 104—or fewer. Even with streamlined licensing procedures and certified reactor designs, it will take ten, twelve years or more to license, build and bring a single new reactor online. And since most of the reactor designs being considered are first or second of a kind, count on them taking even longer. Our energy future ultimately will be carbon-free and nuclear-free, based primarily on solar and wind power, energy efficiency, and distributed generation. What is perhaps less obvious is that the future is now. In the years we’d be waiting for that first new reactor to come online, we can install ten times or more solar and wind capacity, and save twenty times or more that much power through increased efficiency while building the mass production that reduces costs, especially for photovoltaics. By the time that first reactor could come online, solar could already be cost-competitive, while wind and efficiency already are cheaper than nuclear. We no longer have ten years to begin reducing carbon emissions. Waiting around for a few new reactors won’t help our climate, but it would waste the funds needed to implement our real energy future.

#### Too late to solve warming – there’s no evidence that the effects of existing emissions can be reversed fast enough or in sufficient amounts to prevent the impact.

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[Gregory, on the Board of Directors of the Jasenovac Research Institute and on the Advisory Board of the Korea Truth Commission. He is the author of the book Strange Liberators: Militarism, Mayhem, and the Pursuit of Profit. Climate Change: Earth's Unthinkable Future Global Research, November 13, 2010 http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=ELI20101113&articleId=21904]

Threatening temperatures are likely to arrive surprisingly soon. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) determined that if greenhouse gas emissions were to drop "precipitously" overnight and concentrations remained at current levels, then what is currently in the atmosphere has already committed us to an increase of 4.3°F by the end of the century. (5) The problem, of course, is that greenhouse gas emissions are not going to drop to near zero. Indeed, the rate of emissions continues to escalate. Add to that the fact that the consensus-building structure of the IPCC inherently produces results leaning to the conservative. Furthermore, the IPCC's estimates are derived from models that are based only on fast feedback processes. Excluded are more gradual processes such as methane emissions from thawing permafrost and oceans shifting from absorbing to releasing carbon dioxide. Nor does it account for feedback effects resulting from the shrinking of the cryosphere and vegetation changes. (6)